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FOREWORD
This "Information Service" has been initiated and established
by the Chief of Naval Personnel for the benefit of officers unable to
attend the Naval War College.
Articles selected for publication are considered to be of value
to all officers. However, their publication should not be considered
as reflecting the opinion of the Naval War College.
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IRAN
A lecture delivered by

Mr. Edwin M. Wright
at the Naval War College
January 18, 1949
Iran, formerly called Persia by the West, is a large area of
628,000 square miles consisting mostly of rugged mountain ranges

higher than any in Europe and comparable to our western Rocky
Mountains in height, length and breadth. Similar to Utah, Nevada,
Idaho and Wyoming in appearance, it suffers from excessive arid

ity in most areas. While the great central desert plateau has an
elevation of three to four thousand feet, it receives only three to
four inches of annual rainfall and is therefore exceedingly sparsely
populated. The chains of mountains on the west and north catch
the moisture of rising currents of air and so are blessed with some
20 inches of rain per year while on the slopes of the Elburz, facing

the moisture laden winds crossing the Caspian Sea, a total of 60-80
inches of rainfall affords life to a mass of tall and tangled jungle
growth. On the steamy Caspian Sea coast, these jungles have been
cut down and intensive rice cultivation has been introduced, thus
supplying livelihood to the most concentrated population in the
country.

Geography has had an important role to play in the history
of Iran. The jagged mountain barriers have tended to isolate the

people from the Arabs to the west, the Slavic hordes to the north,
and the Indic masses to the east. Yet natural passes through the
mountains have tended to make Iran a bridge of communications

for great migrations and trade. Since antiquity, the great silk route
from China to the shores of the Mediterranean traversed Iran,,
Mr. Wright was born in Iran and is at present with the State Dec
partment as Special Assistant to the Director of Near Eastern and
African Affairs.
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witnessing invasions of Indo-Iranian tribes as early as the XII
Century B. C., to be followed by Parthians, Greeks, Huns, Turks,

Arabs and Mongols. While the gates of the Caucasus successfully
held off the pressures of the Slav for centuries, they finally were
captured in the early Nineteenth Century by Russia, exposing Iran

also to infiltration from the north. So, while the almost impassible
mountains have helped to preserve a definite Iranian culture and

people, the great highways and Iran's strategical position have in
vited numerous incursions, thus creating strong racial, linguistic
and cultural cleavages. The 14 to 16 million people can be classified

several ways: as mountain tribesmen, agricultural peasants or town
dwellers. Linguistically, one fin�s the major languages are: Per-·

sian, Kurdish and Turkish, with emphatic dialectical differentiations
such as Luri, Gilaki and Bakhtivari in each group. In addition,
Arabic, Syriac and Armenian are native languages spoken by minor

ity communities. Economically, there is a small privileged land
holding aristocracy, a small artisan town class and a large share-.
cropping agricultural peasantry. Education is limited to a few in

the cities and towns and most of the population is illiterate. With all
this deep and ancient diversification of patterns, there is a basic
Iranian unity of character that has survived.
The Iranian is usually hospitable and courteous but, because
of centuries of conquests, he is also suspicious of strangers. He is

· conscientious regarding the welfare of his family and helping his
friends, but he lacks broader social responsibility. He works hard
for meager returns. Ages of poverty have dulled his sensitiveness
.
'
.
.
!
to general human suffering. Herodotus, in the IV Century BC, remarked that, of all nations, the Persians were the quickest to adopt
foreign traditions. This adjustability has had both good and bad
effects on Iranian character. While at times they have superficially
I
borrowed the outward forms of a strange culture, they have failed
to grasp its inner values. Yet in other cases they have seized the
kernel of a foreign idea, synthesized it with the genius of their own
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and created a new and richer culture. Borrowing the art forms of
the Assyrians, they made them more graceful and vital in their
own distinctive Persian developments. In their religious contribu
tions they permanently enriched both Judaism and Christianity. In
military tactics, they evolved both positional warfare by building
heavy stone castles a thousand years before they appeared in
Europe, and by the Second Century A. D. they created the heavily
armed Kataphracti or armored Knight, who dominated military
tactics during the middle ages in Europe. Taken all in all, the
Iranian contribution to the west is impressive both in quantity and
quality.
Up to the begnning of the sixteenth century Iran occupied
a central position in the world's stage and both received and
radiated influences to regions ranging as far as from China to the
Atlantic. However,, the revolution in geography that came about
as a result of the discovery of the western world and the circum
navigation of the globe, dislocated Iran's world orientation, disrupt
ed her trade and radically reduced her importance. An era of in
ternal stagnation made Iran an easy prey to prowling imperial
forces. Russia launched a series of aggressive wars, detaching
province after province from the north, while Great Britain in the
Nineteenth Century, anxious to create a buffer state between Rus
sia and India, assisted in splitting off the eastern provinces to form
the puppet state of Afghanistan.
By the beginning of this century, it looked as though Iran
had come to the end of her long and remarkable national life. In
ternal decay had almost paralyzed all phases of national life. In
the early 1900's th� mounting tensions in Europe, associated with
the rise of Germany, stimulated Great Britain to find a potential
ally in Russia. So, in 1905 the British sent Sir Arthur Nicholson as
Ambassador to St. Petersburg with instructions to sound out Rus
sian desires. Russia eventually replied that she would favor an

3
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agreement with Great Britain, thus isolating Germany, if Great
Britain would recognize primary Russian interests in certain parts
of the Far East, Tibet and in Iran. Here Russia touched a tender
spot in the British strategy of defending her Empire, for Iran con
trols the land approaches to both the Suez Canal and India and
also would afford Russia free access to the seven seas. Yet the
necessity of weaning Russia away from Germany was so great
that by 1907 · Great Britain and Russia signed a secret partition
of Iran, by which Russia was granted a large area in the north for
"a special sphere of interest" while Great Britain retained a broad
strip controlling the Persian Gulf. Iran was not consulted. Dra
matic events soon followed in both spheres. The Russians soon
found excuse to intervene in a military way and occupy northern
Iran, while in the south the British struck oil in deposits so rich
that there soon followed an international scramble for the rights
and control of this fabulous discovery of wealth and power. The
events of 1907 were epochal for Iran inasmuch as they brought that
almost forgotten country once more under the focus of world in
terest. Russian penetration and oil remain the keys to understand. ing the theme of subsequent history in Iran. Let me belabor
these two points for a few moments. First that of Russian pene
tration.
As early as 1906, the Czars had indicated that they desired
all of Iran as the price of entering an entente with Great Britian.
The introduction of Russian troops in all northern Iran in 1909
had only half realized the Russian goal, but this aroused a nascent
nationalism in Iran which resulted in an appeal to the United States
for help. In order to strengthen Iranian independence, the United
States recommended a financial adviser, Mr. Morgan Shuster, to
assist Iran. But soon after his arrival in 1910, he ran afoul Russian
intrigues and under pressure of Russian threats, he was expelled
from Iran. His book "The Strangling of Persia" became a classic
study of the tactics of encroachment by a great power.

4
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During World War I, Iran became a battlefield. Russian
forces used Iran as a corridor through which to outflank Turkey.
Germany organized a Fifth Column with which to attack the oil

wells while the British introduced forces to protect them. Iran was
impoverished and all central authority crushed by these events put
a strong resentment toward Europe had developed-a xenophobia

that was to mould Iranian foreign policy for the next generation.
Iran wanted no vestige of foreign influence to remain but there
•. was no internal power to implement this desire. However, chaos
gave birth to a rampant nationalism which was seized upon by a

clever, stubborn but uneducated army officer called Riza Khan. By
a series of coup d'etats, he took hold of the reins of authority, in

jected some discipline in the army and rapidly promoted himself
. through successive steps to Prime Minister. In 1925, he exiled the
inept, worthless, degenerate monarch, Ahmed Shah, and followed
this the next year by crowning himself King. Having gained supreme
authority, Riza Shah launched Iran on a program of reforms and
)

development, totalling a capital investment of nearly $250,000,000

by 1939, which amazed everyone. Iranian life underwent drastic
adjustments in an effort to make Iran self-sufficient and to cut·
loose from all foreign penetration. The plan borrowed many details

from that promulgated by Mustafa Kemal of Turkey but it had

glaring defects. Riza Shah developed a megalomania, a vindictive

ness and greed which sabotaged much of the good at which his re

forms were aimed. So, while outwardly great strides were made in
security, education, health, transportation and centralization of au

thority, an excessive price was paid in the growth of graft and in

depressing the purchasing power of the peasantry. However, the
period 1925-39 was one of outward splendor and independence.

The U. S. S. R. had officially kept a proper attitude toward

Iran but with ,the sign of an international war appearing in 1936

when Italy attacked Ethiopia and. the Spanish Civil War broke out,

5
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949

9

RESTRICTED

Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 5, Art. 1

large groups of Soviet trained Iranian revolutionaries were secret
ly sent to Iran to penetrate and capture the immature laboring
groups and idealistic intelligentia. They were unusually successful
in spite of police raids and vigilance, so that by 1939, there was a
sut?stantial and c,ompetent Soviet Fifth Column prepared to operate.
Then in the fateful Nazi-Soviet Pacts of 1940, the USSR insisted
"that its territorial aspirations center south of the national terri
tory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." Thus
Iran lay directly athwart the path of Soviet expansion. Assured by
Germany of a free hand, the USSR began to look for a pretext for
intervention. It came from an unexpected quarter a year later,
three months after Hitler had violated his pact and attacked the
Soviet Union from the west.
Iran desperately clung to the hope that she could remain
neutral but the presence of a small German colony added to the need
for opening a route by which supplies could reach the Soviet Union
and prompted the USSR and Great Britain to send in troops on
August 25, 1941. Resistance collapsed in four days, while in the
wake of the Red Army there appeared a well trained cadre of agita
tors, labor organizers and terrorists, who at once began to infiltrate
the army, the government, labor groups and political organizations.
This process was slowed because of the presence of British and U.S.
troops who were handling Lend Lease shipments across Iran, and
because President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill at the Teheran Con
ference in December 1943 persuaded Mr. Stalin to sign the agree
ment declaring a common desire to protect the integrity of Iran. •
But as World War II came to a close in Europe and Asia, the ma
chinery of rebellion was placed in motion and under the protection
of Red guns, an autonomous government was established in Azar
baijan, Iran's richest province adjoining the Soviet border. Then
after all other foreign troops had left, and in violation of treaty
agreements, the Red Army remained in Iran until the Kremlin felt

6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss5/1

10

Naval War College: May 1949 Full Issue

RESTRICTED

that it had established firmly the puppet government of Azarbaijan
and, through obtaining a joint. Soviet-Iranian oil agreement, had
guaranteed future domination of all northern Iran. This activity led

to a heated clash at the United Nations when Iran complained of
Soviet interference in her internal affairs and the United States

took the lead in challenging Soviet activity. By March 1946 the
East-West clash was obvious and Iran had been the first issue to
expose it.
During the past three years the Soviet Union has pulled out
every stop except that of open military invasion, to try to break
down the will of Iran to resist. Diplomatic threats, military demon
strations across the border, radio blasts, fomenting of strikes and
accusations of pl9tting aggression against the USSR; all these have
failed to bend Iran to submission. Increasing royalties from oil pro
duction and advice from U. S. military missions have aided Iran
during this period of tension. And, although temporarily frustrated,

the USSR still considers Iran the center of her territorial aspirations,
because the Soviet leaders know that, with Iran in their grasp, all

land communications between Asia and Europe would be disrupted
and new continents exposed to the march of revolution.

Iran was the goal of many a conqueror because of her val
uable position as related to communication. But to this prize of
Iran has been added that of vast oil resources discovered, as I
mentioned, in 1907. Although the estimates of oil reserves is

quoted at four billion barrels, less than one-sixth of the country
has been explored. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company holding the con
cession is fifty-five percent a British Government investment. The
peculiar geology of the oil domes makes it possible to extract im
mense quantities of oil with a small investment. From about sixty
five wells, a total of 500,000 barrels a day is being produced. One

well at Gaj Saran, brought in in 1913, is still producing nearly 7,000
barrels per day without being put to the pump. Its total production
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I
I

in thirty-five years has totalled nearly 90,000,000 barrels, and it
seems capable of continuing this indefinitely. The average well in
the U.S. A. brings in twelve barrels per day. This valuable asset was
of vital importance during the past war. Iranian oil was the main
source of power for the British Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Armies,
the U.S. Ninth Air Force while stationed in Egypt and Chennault's
Tigers in China. It supplied these needs in addition to the civilian
demands of the Near East and India as well as West Africa. Last
year U.S. marketers, such as Socony Vacuum and Standard Oil of
New Jersey, negotiated for a purchase of $250,000,000 of Iranian
oil with which to supply their European markets.
Oil has thus become a dramatic element in Iranian life. It
makes possible those economic developments which will end the
age old poverty under which Iran has suffered. It contributes to the
development of Europe and to safeguarding our own oil resources.
But these very factors make it a danger to the survival of Iran as an
independent state. While the Soviet Union is on the prowl and
hoping to seize Iran both for its central strategic position and its
petroleum wealth, Iran finds itself under heavy strain to survive.
It has one more chance. If it can develop responsible leadership,
utilize its resources honestly and develop a social conscience, then
class and regional separatism will decrease and a healthy nation will
face its tasks with high hopes of a national future. Again the
United States will be called upon for help. About 600 Iranian. stu
dents are now being educated in graduate and post graduate
courses in the U. S. A. American engineers are advising on a large
seven year economic development plan. U. S. dollars will be asked
to supply a part of the machinery essential for economic exploita
tion of Iran's wealth.
So the turning wheel of fate has brought these two countries,
Iran and the U. S. A., one of the world's oldest and one of the new
est, into close and intimate association. Each one needs the con-
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tribution of the other toward building a healthy and stable world
society. And while we still represent the greatest warehouse and

arsenal of democracy, Iran holds a position on the front line com
bating totalitarianism and aggression. In spite of all her weak

nesses and defects, Iran has shown a will to survive. Only there
was the iron curtain pushed back by the determination of its own
�eople. And where such a will to be . independent exists, it de
serves our encouragement and cooperation.

9
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949

13

Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 5, Art. 1

RESTRICTED

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
A lecture delivered by

Judge Manley 0. Hudson
at the Naval War College
December 15, 1948

In his introduction to the latest Blue Book published by the
Naval War College, Admiral Spruance quoted what he termed "a

prophetic utterance" made in 1889 by William Edward Hall. Hall's

treatise on International Law was a standard exposition of the Brit
ish point of view over a whole generation. This was his statement
which was quoted by Admiral Spruance:
"It is a matter of experience that times, in which inter
national law has been seriously disregarded, have been
followed by periods in which the European conscience has
done penance by putting itself under straiter obligations
than those which it had before acknowledged. There is
no necessity to suppose that things will be otherwise in the
future. I therefore look forward with much misgiving to
the manner in which the next great war will be waged, but
with no misgiving at all as to the character of the rules
which will be acknowledged ten years after its termination,
by comparison with the rules now considered to exist."
We live today in a decade following a great war.

I wish

I might tell you that because of the penance which the world's
conscience has suffered, great changes are in progress such as Hall
foresaw. I would find it difficult to make such a. statement, how

ever, and perhaps we shall be on safer ground if we confine our
attention today to the international law which has grown up in the
past, even though in some respects it has been seriously disregard
ed in recent years.

Judge Hudson since 1923 has held the Bemis Professorship of Inter
national Law at Harvard Law School. He has written several books
on International Law, and served for a number of years on The Hague
Court of Arbitration and the Permanent Court of International
Justice.
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Our system of international law has been developed over a
period of more than three centuries. It is distinctly Western and
European in origin. In tracing its growth, we usually refer to the
Spanish jurist-theologians of the sixteenth century, but we ascribe
first place to Hugo Grotius whose great book on "The Law of War
and Peace" was first published in 1625. For a long period, inter
national law was conceived to be not only European, but also
Christian, and its application was limited to Christian States. In
the course of the nineteenth century, however, we broke our
selves free from such limitations, and in the words of the World
Court the principles of international law "are in force between all
independent nations" and "apply equally" to all of them.
Fundamental in our thinking on international law is the
conception of a community of States. All States are necessarily
members of this community. There is no room in the modern
world for a hermit State living outside of the community-even
Nepal has recently come to a realization of this fact, and has
brought itself into relations with other States.
If you ask me the number of States forming this inter
national community, I cannot give a simple answer and I think
you and I might have some differences of opinion. There are
fifty-eight "States" which are members of the United Nations
at least they are all called "States" in the Charter, though some
of them do not deserve the compliment. A considerable number
of States are not members of the United Nations. However; if
we attempted to list them, we should probably be able to agree on
fifteen; but we might run into differences of opinion concerning
an additional eight or ten, for the status of some political com
munities is always in doubt. New States have come upon the hori
zon, and some of those we listed a decade ago have disappeared.
We start basically, then, with the fact that some seventy-
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five or eighty States exist in the world-they are more interde
pendent than independent-and with the conception that these
. States form a community. This community must have a law to
regulate the relations of its members. That is the fundamental
fact underlying international law.
This community has suffered greatly in the past from lack of
. organization. In the early part of the last century, what was known
as the Concert of Europe assumed a general direction of European
affairs in times of crisis; but organization for regulating ordinary
peace-time relations was wholly lacking. Soon after the middle of
the century, as the progress of inventions began to draw peoples
nearer together, we began to get some permanent organizations.
An International Telegraphic Union, formed in 1865, still exists as
the International Telecommunications Union; and the Universal
Postal Union, formed in 1874, is still functioning smoothly.
Such successes led quite naturally to attempts to form in
ternational organization of a more general character. The series of
Peace Conferences held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907-the Con
ference projected for 1914 never met- represented a feeble effort
in this direction. Far more ambitious was the League of Nations
which began to function in 1920. In the course of twenty years,
it laid many useful foundations. Looking back on the period, its
failures can easily be exaggerated-in some part they were due
to the abstention of our own country. Yet the successes were
notable, and they paved the way for a new effort to be under
taken when a disastrous World War had intervened.
The United Nations follows in the footsteps of the League of
Nations. Indeeed, its Charter is in a sense a revised version of the
Covenant. I am not disposed to overstate the prospect created by
such a world organization. It still lacks universality. It is crippled
by limitations, some of them formalized in its Charter, some of
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them due to divisions among peoples which the Charter cannot erase.
Of course failures are to be expected-that is true also of the
Government of the United States, though it is one of the most

stable and successful governments in the world. Yet failure does
not always denote the unwisdom of initial effort, and if the United
Nations can be kept functioning its successes may far outbalance
its failures.

A prospect exists, therefore, for a greatly strength

ened international law to serve the interests of a community of

States, more integrated than it has ever been in the past.

I think one can safely speak today of a growing body of
constitutional international law. Even· since 1945, great progress
has been
made
in this direction. The Charter of the United Nations
.
.
.
is mo�e
than
international
treaty. Some of its. provis,.
.
. an ordiiiary
.
.

ions expressly envisage States which are not parties to it.

And

under the Charter a number of specialized agencies have been
brought into relations with the over-all Organization-a feat which
was never achieved by the League of Nations despite the antici- ·
pation put down in Article 24 of the Covenant.

One can also speak toda,y of a great volume of international
legislation which orders our international intercourse. It is true
that we do not have an international parliament exercising legis

lative functions analogous to those of the Congress of the United
States or of the Parliament at Westminster. Yet it would be a mis
take to draw from this fact the deduction that we have no legis

lation operating across national frontiers. , Over almost a hun
dred years, a clear-cut legislative process has been developed;

after preparations which are frequently very protracted, repre

sentatives of many States assemble in an international confer
ence, and they often succeed in reaching agreement on legis

lative texts which later become operative in consequence of their·
ratification. International legislation is like national legislation
14
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in that there is no requirement that it be universally applicable, or
that it-should bind those who do not assent to it.
Thanks to this international legislative process, we have to
day a great volume of world law, some of it accumulated over a period
of many years. Unfortunately, it is little known. Even writers on
international law often ignore it, so that we cannot be too severe in
our reproof of those lay writers and speakers who advocate the
creation of a vague "world law" without taking account of what we

have already. In a series of fat volumes entitled " International
Legislation," I have attempted to collect the legislative texts of

the past thirty years; these volumes are in the Library of the
Naval War College, and if you will glance at them I think you will
be impressed with the extent of the achievement.
During the past hundred years, progress can also be noted
in the field of international adjudication. Here, too, we have suf
fered from lack of organization in the past. Yet in the course of
a century, scores of ad hoc international tribunals have been

created for the judicial application of international law, and with but

few exceptions they have functioned with remarkable success. The
fact inspired a robust movement for creating a permanent tribunal
to which States might take their differences for adjudication ac
cording to law. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, created in 1899,
as a consequence of this movement, was indeed a feeble step; yet
for a quarter of a century, it yielded some results. If it is now some
what moribund, it still exists with the support of more than forty
States. The Central American Court of Justice, created under a
Convention of 1907, had a checkered career and expired at the end
of a decade.

A more important step for strengthening international law
was taken in 1920 when the Permanent Court of International
Justice was created. For almost twenty years before the recent
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war, it functioned actively to the general satisfaction of the world.
As I was for ten years a judge of this Court, it was a happy day for
me when the Conference at San Francisco decided to take the Court
over as an organ of the United Nations, and to annex its Statute,
slightly refurbished, to the Charter. It was rechristened the In
ternational Court of Justice, but the chain of continuity was not
broken. This Court is now in session at The Hague, dealing with
the Corfu Channel Case between the United Kingdom and Albania
-a case of great interest to naval officers. I am now engaged in
writing the story of its activities during its twenty-seventh y�r.
I do not minimize the difficulty of persuading States to con
fer on the World Court jurisdiction over their legal disputes; In
1945, as in 1920, a determined effort was made to write into its
Statute provisions which would have invested the Court with what
we call "compulsory jurisdiction"-i. e., jurisdiction independent of
States' consent given at the time. While that effort failed, provisions
were adopted to enable States desiring to do so to confer such juris
diction on the Court as between themselves, and thirty-two States
are now bound by declarations which have this effect. It is to me a
matter for regret that the declaration made by the United States in
1946 was narrowed by two frustrating reservations, one of which
would disable the Court from exercising jurisdiction over a dispute
to which the United States is a party if the United States declares
the dispute to relate to a domestic matter. Fortunately, this Ameri
can example has not been followed by many other States. Despite
such difficulties one can only conclude that very considerable prog
ress has been made in this matter.
More encouraging, perhaps, is the fact that general agree
ment now exists in the world on the basic features of international
adjudication. Opinion is unanimous as to the nature of the judicial
function, and as to the essential elements of the procedure to be
followed. Nor is there disagreement concerning the obligation of
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S,tates to comply with a judgment of an international tribunal. As a
matter of history, the record of such compliance over the years is
quite remarkable. If there have been a few' cases in which losing
States have refused to carry out international judgments, they are
the exception and not the rule. Not once has any State defied the
World Court by declining to abide by its judgment declaring the ap
plicable law.
I have spoken of the growth of a constitutional international
law for the community of States, of the development of a fecund
process of international legislation, and of the reassuring record of
international tribunals. Let me now say a word concerning the vast
number of bipartite treaties by which States have sought to regu
late their conduct.
l suspect that most of us do not appreciate the number of
treaties in force in the world at any given time. Some twenty years
ago, a colleague of mine estimated that not less than fifteen thousand
treaties were then in force. I believe his estimate today would go
beyond that figure, though the precise status of some treaties may
be in doubt. The Department of State is now issuing an excellent
publication entitled United States Treaties and Other International
Acts Series. If you will leaf through the recent numbers of that
Series, I think you may be surprised at the extent of your American
treaty law. Such bipartite treatjes are followed and applied in
every-day life as a matter of course. Rarely, in time of peace at any
rate, does any State refuse to meet its treaty obligations as it un
derstands them to be. No country wishes to have the reputation of
violating its pledged word.
Two facts are outstanding from this review: first, that judg
ments of international tribunals are as a rule always complied with;
and second, that treaty obligations are habitually met.
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There remains another field in which international law has
been and continues to be developed-the field of customary law.
When over a considerable period of time we find that a number of

States have followed a course of action in the belief that they were
acting in accordance with what the law ordains, we can say that a
customary rule of law has come into being. Such a situation must
be appreciated, of course, and the appreciation must be made by

men trained in legal technique. I do not wish to exaggerate the ex
tent to which. existing international law is based on practice evi

dencing custom, but within limits this must be recognized as one of

the ways by which law accumulates.

Perhaps, I should illustrate this point.

Over a course of

many years, numerous States asserted jurisdiction over a part of

the seas bathing their coasts; gradually, the range of cannon-shot

was taken as the limit of such jurisdiction, and in the nineteenth

century this range came to be measured jn terms of leagues or miles.

The States of the world are not agreed on the number of miles

some take three, some take more; but there is now a rule of cus

tomary law that the marginal sea forms part of the territory of a

littoral State, subject only to the innocent passage of the vessels

at least the merchant vessels-of other States.

What I have said may be summarized in a statement con

cerning the sources of International Law. Basing myself on Article

38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, I must put

first "international conventions, whether general or particular,

establishing rules recognized by the States concern(;)d." Then a
second source is "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law"; these are the words of the Statute, but
I should prefer to say "international practice, as evidence of a
general custom accepted as law." Then the Statute lists "the gen

eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations"-this seems
to mean that the Court may apply principles of national law; as all
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n�tions are "civilized," though not in one mould, perhaps the limita
tion in the Statute is a bit invidious.
Fourth and fifth sources are put down in the Statute as
"judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations"; but these are referred to as only
"subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." Inter.:.
national judicial decisions do not narrow down from precedent to
precedent as do the decisions of national courts in our common law.
A case seldom invovles a situation precisely analogous to that of
a previous case, and precedent plays less of a role in international
adjudications than in the work of national courts.
As to the teachings of publicists, I would suggest that one
must be on his guard. Few are writers whose works can be used
without careful attention to their nationality, the date and place of
their writing, and the circumstances which inspired it. Writers,
even dead ones, seldom deserve the compliment paid in calling them
"authorities." In this country, the treatise published by Wheaton
a century ago is outstanding-it has gone through many editions,
and has been widely published in translations-and yet I should
hesitate to consider it authoritative.
If you wish to have at hand a useful readable treatise which
is not too bulky for. following the development of international
law, I can suggest two such small volumes to you: "The Law of
Nations," by my Oxford colleague Professor J. L. Brierly-now in
its third edition; and "International Law" by my friend Charles

G. Fenwick, of the Pan American Union-also now in its third
edition. I can also suggest two periodicals which you may wish to
have at hand: the weekly Bulletin of the Department of State, and
the quarterly American Journal of International Law, over the past
forty-two years.
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My lecture today is of an introductory character. I have
sought to give you only a general account of the legal fo,undations
of international relations, without going into the substantive con
tent of our existing law. In our future work we shall have occasion
to muster some of its precepts and principles, and to relate them to
the concrete situations with which a naval officer is frequently
faced.
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OFFENSIVE

An article by

Air Commodore L. MacLean

*

*

*

Smooth the descent and easy is the way:
The gates of hell stand open night and day
But to return, and view the cheerful skies,
In this the task and mighty labour lies.

*

*

*

-Dryden

"You can stand in any one of a thousand places in the

larger cities of Germany and as far as the eye can see there is
nothing but ruin. Many of · those areas will not be rebuilt for

generations-if they are rebuilt at all." Those are the opening
words of an article entitled "Thoughts on the Devastation of the
German Cities," by Leo A. Codd, Editor of the American maga
zine Ordnance. H<:\ continues: "Words and photographs are in
adequate to describe the degree of damage that has been done to
European culture in all the countries where total war from the air

was waged."

From the spiritual he descends to the material and quotes
statistics: "To appraise the cost to ourselves in material and in effort ponder these figures: there were more than 1,440,000 bomber

sorties and 2,680,000 fighter sorties flown against the enemy. The

cost in dollars to the United States for its part in the Air War in
Europe was more than $43,000,000,000." His figures are taken from
the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and are therefore au
thoritative.
This article is reprinted from the British Magazine, "Fighting Forces."
The opinions expressed are those of the author. Its publication here
in reflects neither the approval nor disapproval of the U. S. Navy or
the Naval War College. It is presented merely to acquaint officers with
one point of view.
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The cost of the British share, extending as it did over a much
longer period, cannot have been less. We thus reach a combined
total, expressed in sterling, for the whole air war in Europe, of the
order of 21,000,000,000 pounds, a figure at which comprehension
boggles. It would be well indeed to ponder on the return for this
prodigious outlay since the success or failure of a war, like any
other form of the business of life, can only be judged on the basis
of results accruing in relation to energy· expended. Materially this
country is now bankrupt. Spiritually-"What shall it profit a man
if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"
War is essentially an affair of ethics as well as , economics
and, though the economical aspect presses heavily on the people of
the world today, the ethical aspect has continuously occupied the
thoughts of mankind in an unceasing endeavour to diminish war's
inevitable horrors, and to limit and localize its effects. The advocates
of "air power", in urging their claim for precedence, took a firm
stand, with a foot planted squarely on each of these bases. In
comparison with war waged by military or sea power, air warfare,
they maintained, would prove not only more humane but incom
parably cheaper. Humane, they argued, because aerial bombard
ment would not be directed towards the wholesale destruction of
humanity, but focussed on those few centres vital to national life,
would, through a dislocation of governmental control and the
routine of living, undermine public morale, destroy the will to
fight and cause a collapse at the centre regardless of the outcome
of naval or military action. Cheaper-because cheapness is, of
course, inherent in a short war waged by a small air force whose
attacks would be so precisely focussed.
Such was the Air Staff's gospel of war, propagated as
siduously throughout some twenty years from 1919 onwards; and
the people of this country began ·the war deluded into the belief that
it was well founded · and practicable. About this let there be no
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mistake or evasive thinking. The simple summary above is the es

sence and substance of what was'fed to the public and is essentially
and substantially what the man in the street believes today. The
protagonists of this gospel were acclaimed, not because of their

powers of logical deduction from past events but because, pre
sumably by divine inspiration, they could, despite the lessons from
-those events, prophesy a new era.
By 1925 the separatist Air Staff doctrine, purely conjec
tural, had been crystaUized and was officially enunciated by the
Commandant of the R. A. F. Staff College as follows:

"If the Government had decided that the main ef

fort towards winning the war was to be made by its air
power, the object of the Air Force will be to dislocate

the national life of the enemy people: and the vital cen

tres would then be-:-the seat of government, transport
and communication systems and the water, light and food

, supply."

That the Government did decide, at an early date in hos
tilities, that the main effort towards winning the war was to be

made by air power, is easily ascertained by reference to the utter
ances of such public authorities as Mr. Churchill and Sir Arthur

Harris. Sir Arthur Harris-a Marshall of the Royal Air Force-

in his book "Bomber Offensive" writes on page 53:

"It is worth while remarking that no other
country in the world had at that time* conceived the pos
sibility of using an air force in this way to fight a war
by itself and, within certain limits, win a war outright."
On page 54:
"Winning a war by bombing as at that time** we

were proposing to do."

* 1940
** 1941
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And, finally on page 76:
The general idea at this time*** on what civil
serv�nts always call a high level, was that the main and
almost the only purpose of bombing was to attack the
morale of the industrial workers."
Similarly, Mr. Churchill, in a number of speeches, left little
doubt on the point, but in particular, in an address to Congress
in Washington on 19th May, 1943, he said:
"Opinion, Mr. President, is divided as to whether
th� use of air power by itself will bring about a collapse
of Germany or Italy. The experiment is well worth trying."
It is unnecessary further to labour the point. We have from
these two supreme authorities that it was the policy of the Govern
ment, accepted by the Air Staff, that the Air Force should at
tempt the task of fighting and winning a war by an unprecedented
process emploring an entirely new technique---the process of strik
ing direct at the vital centres in the enemy's economy, using a
technique of selective obliteration by means of bombs from the air,
to bring about a collapse of public morale and the surrender of the
enemy government through popular pressure.
Since the collapse of neither Italy nor Germany did oc
cur until, in the first case American and British armies had over
run the country, and in the second American, British and Russian
armies had, foot by foot, fought their way to a convergence from
all sides on to Germany's capital with her armies hemmed in and
immovable, it is unnecessary to labour the failure of this air
power experiment--the most costly in history.
••• 1942
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Despite this failure, the old soothsayers-unabashed, un

ashamed and active-are still making the same prophecies and the
bomber doctrine is still booming.

It is therefore more than ever

necessary to extricate from the morass of propaganda the few
pieces of substance and truth.

�

In previous articles I have indicated the oblique conse-

quences, on naval and military operations, of the separatist doc
trine.

In this article I intend to trace the course of the central

bomber offensive, not with a view to emphasizing its self-evident

failure but in order to reach some estimate Qf how much or how
little it contributed towards, or even retarded, victory.

The indispensable foundation, to bring the experiment even

into the realms of feasibility, is the ability on the part of the
bombing force to hit. a preselected target of known importance in

the enemy's economic system. The questions demanding an answer
are: Did the bomber force in fact possess the required skill?

If

not, to what extent was this skill lacking and were the Air Staff

. aware of its absence before war began?

The first lesson, learned at a desperate price, was that day

light bombing was out of the question.

Both Lord Tedder and

Sir Arthur Harris leave little doubt about that.

Tedder, in the

course of a lecture at Cambridge on 18th February, 1947, stated:

"Our operations against the Germ1;1,n fleet showed up one

respect in which we had been wrong.

It had been thought that,

though the.bomber could not by its very nature be as fast as the

fighter, yet it could cope with the fighter provided it had sufficient

speed and effective defensive armament.

The heavy casualties

suffered by the raids off Kiel and Wilhelmshaven showed that this

was not the .case and from that time on till late in the war the

great bulk of our bomber operations over Germany were at night."

25
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss5/1

28

R�STRICTED

Naval War College: May 1949 Full Issue
ii

I
I

Harris, less circumlocutory, on page 73 of "Bomber Of
fensive," states.
"The German defenses were so strong that it was impossible
to operate regularly or with any sizeable force by day, so that all
our main operations were confined to the hours of darkness."
On page 80:
"Our attacks on the German naval units during the phoney
war had shown that we could not operate by day over Germany

without completely prohibitive casualties for day fighters and we
at once began to ppepare and train for bo:qibing at night."
Moreover, on page 39 he demolishes the implication by
Tedder that reasonable care had been devoted to ensuring that our
bombers were adequately fast and armed. He states:
"The Hampden was cold meat for any determined fighter in

daylight as I knew it would be and we got one or two pretty
serious knocks. The Hampden was then a most feebly armed
aircraft with a single gun on top and a single one underneath
manned by a gunner in a hopelessly cramped position, together
with a gun firing forward which, as it was fixed, was of no value
at all."

Wing Commander Guy Gibson, V. C., describes, in "Enemy
Coast Ahead," one of the serious knocks which Harris mentions.
He writes, on page 67 :

"When, however, these Hampden squadrons ;were given

their chance and did get to Norway in daylight it was pretty fierce
slaughter. Their orders were to fly in a very tight box so as to
bring as much defensive armament as possible to bear on oncoming
fighters, but the Germans were no fools ; they had found a weak
spot in the Hampdens, for at that time there was a blind area on
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either side and the Huns made the best of their knowledge_______ _

Their mode of attack was to fly in formation with the Hampdens

perhaps fifty yards out and slightly to the front, and pick off the

outside men with their one gun aiming with a no-deflection shot

at the pilot.

The bomber boys could do nothing about it; they

just had to sit there and wait to be shot down. If they broke away

they were immediately pounced on by three Messerschmitt 109's
waiting in the background.

If they stayed the pilot received a

machine-gun serenade in his face.

down from the wing man inwards.

One by one they were hacked
Watts said it was a terrible

sight to see them burst into flames at about twenty feet, then

cartwheel one wing into the cold sea. First B Beer went; that was
poor old Peter.

Who was next? There was H Harry on the out

side. The German gunner carefully took aim, then a few minutes
later H Harry disappeared beneath the flaming waves.
poor old Charles.

That was

One pilot made the hopeless gesture of pulling

back his hood and firing his revolver at the enemy gunner, but it
.

)

was no good and his brave act was the last thing he did on this

earth.

At last low cloud was reached and four out of the twelve

managed to scrape home."

This kind of slaughter was not peculiar to the Hampdens.

Wing Commander Asher Lee, in his book "The German Air Force,"

describes the fate of theBattle and Blenheim squadrons in 1940. He
writes on page 55 :

"The same relative impotence characterized the daylight

attacks by British Blenheims and Battles on German troops and
communications in the battle area.

Flying mostly without escort

and in small numbers, they were engaged in operations which
were at best hazardous and in the main suicidal."

By the time that it had been decided to resort to night
bombing as the panacea against slaughter, the bomber force had
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